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IN THE SUPREME COURT
QF THE STATE "OF UTAH
FO,ULGER EQUIPMENT CO·MPANY,
a Utah Corporation,
_,,
Petitioner~

·

vs.
STATE T A X COMMIS·SION 0 F
UTAH and ORVILLE GUNTHER,
DONALD T. ADAMS, ARIAS G. BELNAP, and ALLAN.M. LIPMAN constituting the Inembers of said commission,
Respondents.

Case No.

10222

RESP'O·NDENT'S' BRIEF
S·TATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an original proceeding in the Supreme Court
for an extraordinary writ in the nature of mandamus.
The petition for such writ follows denial by the State
Tax Commission of a petition and demand of Foulger
Equipment for promulgation of regulations to implement
Section 59-2-14, et seq., U.C.A. 1953.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX CO·MMISSION
In a decision dated August 18, 1964, following a
formal hearing before a lawfully constituted quorum of
1
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the State Tax ·Com1nission, the petition of Foulger
Equipment Company, filed with the Commission on
August 10, 1964, was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAl~
Respondents seek a denial of the petition for an
extraordinary writ filed by petitioner, Foulger Equipment Company.

STA·TEMENT OF FACTS
·The parties to this action, on August 18, 1964, stipulated through their respective counsel to the follo,ving
facts:
1. Petitioner, Foulger Equipn1ent Co1npany, is a
corporation organized under the laws of Utah, authorized to do business in this state, and doing business at
1361 South Second West, Salt Lake City, Utah.
2. Petitioner's business is the sale and distribution
of industrial equipment and machinery.
3. Petitioner's business includes the out-of-state
sale of certain items of industrial equipment and machinery after storage in Utah for periods not exceeding
twelve months prior to shipment out of the state for such
sale.
4. Petitioner, in past years, has been assessed for
property of the type described in the previous paragraph
and paid tax thereon 'vhen such equipment and 1nachin2
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ery has been in its possession on January 1st of any
given year.
5. The 1963 Utah L·egislature passed Substitute
Senate Bill 27, now codified as Section 59-2-14, et seq.,
U:C.A. 1953, which h,tw provides as follovvs:
"Tangible personal property being held for
sale or processing and which is present in Utah
on January 1, m., whether manufactured, processed, produced or otherwise originating within or
without the state, which is shipped to final desination outside this state within twelve months following is deemed to have acquired no situs in Utah
for ad valorem property tax purposes and shall be
exempt.
"The Utah state tax commission shall prescribe rules and regulations under which the foregoing exemption may be claimed and applied.
"The burden of proof shall be upon the taxpayer to establish the exemption."
6. The 1963 Legislature also passed Substitute
Senate Joint Resolution No. 5 which will put before the
electorate of this state on November 5, 1964, this proposed amendment (by way of addition) to Article XIII,
Section 2, of the Constitution of the State of Utah :
"Tangible personal property present in Utah
on January 1, m., which is held for sale or processing and which is shipped to ·final destination
outside this state within twelve months may be
deemed by law to have acquired no situs in Utah
for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and
may be exempted by law from such taxation,
whether manufactured, processed or produced or
otherwise originating within or without the state."
3
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7. The State Tax Commission of Utah has. promulgated no rules and regulations under which the exemption proviqed for in Section 59-2-14, et seq., U.C.A. 1953,
may be claimed and applied.

8. ;The State Tax Commission of Utah has been
advised by the Utah Attorney general, in Opinion No.
64-03·5, dated July 23, 1964, that Section 59-2-14, et seq.,
U:C.A. 19'53, is unconstitutional and void and this opinion has been placed into evidence and is by reference
made a part of the record of this case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SE·CTION 59-2-14, U.C.A. 1953, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND V0ID.
1

The 1963 Utah Legislature, in an attempt to provide
a favorable tax climate for industry and investment,
enacted Substitute Senate Bill 27. The bill had the effect
of exempting from ad valorem property taxation properties held in the State of Utah but scheduled for shipment
to a final destination outside the state '''"ithin twelve
months.
Section 2 of the bill provides that the State Tax
Commission. is to prescribe rules and regulations under
which the exe1nption established by the above language
n1ay be claimed and applied, and Section -! of the same
act repeals the existing 90-day inventory statute provided by Section 59-2-4, U.C.A. 1953.
4
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The' l~gislature thereafter · introduced j:oint . resolutions which would. provide for the. •. submission to the
eleetorate of a constitutional amendment allowing · the
above mentioned tax exe1nption · to take effect. The
language of Substitute S.J.R~. No. 5, in pertinent part,
is as follows :
"
. Tangible personal property present
in Utah on January 1, m., which is held for
sale or proeessing and which is shipped to final
destination outside this state within twelve
months may be deemed by law to have acquired
no situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation, whether manufactured, processed
or produced or otherwise originating within or
without the state.... " (Emphasis added.)
The question presented for revie-\v is whether or not
S-enate Bill 27, as enacted by the Utah Legislature and
in effect May 14, 1963, is effective for purposes of granting exemption thereunder, in view of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution.
The power of the State Legislature to· exempt fro1n
taxation is limited only by federal and state constitutional limitations. Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393,
35 N.W.2d 66, app. dismissed 338 U.S. 843, 70 S.Ct. 88,
94 L.Ed. 515; Annotation 61 A.L.R.2d 1065. In Utah,
the power of the legislature to grant tax exemptions is
restricted by the express language of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah ~c·onstitution which provides in part:
"All tangible property in this state not exempt under the laws of the United States, or
under this constitution, shall be taxed in propor5
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tion to its value, to be ascertained as provided
by law.... "
A similar situation arose in the case of State ex rel.
Richards v. Armstrong, 17 Utah 166, 53 Pa.c. 981. In
that case, the state, through the State Auditor, brought
an original action in the Supreme ·Court for a writ of
prohibition restraining the Board of Equalization of
Salt Lake County from granting tax exemptions provided
under Section 2579 of the Revised Statutes of Utah
allowing that board to remit or abate taxes of insane,
idiotic, infirm or indigent persons to an amount not
exceeding $10.00 for the current year. The petitioner
urged that that statute was unconstitutional and void
and that the legislature had no power, under the cons_titution, to exempt any property from the burdens of
taxation, except that expressly exempted by virtue of
the constitution. Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, was
cited to the effect that the constitutional provision quoted
above made manifest:
" ... ~hat no power should exist in state government to grant exemption other than those mentioned in the constitution.
"The presumption is that all exemptions
intended to be granted were granted in express
ter1ns. In such cases the rule of strict construction applies, and, in order to relieve any spe~ies
of property fron1 its due and just proportion
of the burdens of the govern1nent, the language
relied on as creating the exemption should be so
clear as not to admit of reasonable controversy
about its 1neaning, for all doubts 1nust be resolved
against the exemption." Judge v. Spencer, supra.
6
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The court concluded in holding the statute in question null and void:
"Where, however, the mind is convinced of
the unconstitutionality of the law, the duty which
devolves upon the court to declare it so is imperative, even where as in this case, the statute
appears to be at consonance with justice and
humanity." See also Moon Lake Electric Co. v.
State Taxation Commission, 9 Utah 2d 384, 345
P.2d 612.
Section 59-2-14, U.C.A. 1953, purporting to establish
an exemption from ad valorem taxation, became effective, if at all, 60 days after the close of the 1963 legislative session. This effective date was May 14, 1963.
However, as the legislature has no power to grant
exemptions other than those mentioned in the constitution, this bill, purporting to establish such exemptions, was void at the time of its enactment. State ex
rel. Richards v. Armstrong, 17 Utah 166, 53 Pac. 981;
Moon Lake Electric Assoc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2·d 384, 345 P.2d 612. See also State v. Salt
Lake Co., 96 Utah 464, 85 P.2d 851.
An unconstitutional statute is 'vholly void and, in
legal contemplation, is as inoperative as jf it had never
been passed. State v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac.
285; State v. Betensen, 14 Utah 2d 121, 378 P.2d 669.
Thus, it cannot be seriously questioned that Substitute Senate Bill 27 was, at the time of its enactment,
ineffective to. establish exemptions from taxation.
7
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Where a state constitution limits the po\ver of the
legislature to grant tax exemptions, the legislature
should not thereafter be permitted to indii~ectly grant
an exemption which it is precluded from granting 'directly. State v. Yuma I rr. District, 55 Ariz. 178, 99 P.2d 704.
Even though the state is to receive certain benefits
from the taxpayer or from the granting of the exemption
the Utah Legislature, nevertheless, may not commute
taxes where an exemption could not lawfully be granted.
State ex rel. Richards v~ Armstrong, 17 Utah 166, 53
Pac. 981.
Here, what the legislature could not do directly, it
seeks to do indirectly by declaring that property which
will be shipped in interstate commerce within twelve
months out of the State of Utah is "deemed to have
acquired no situs in Utah for ad valorem property tax
purposes. . . ." Certainly, the effect of this language
is to provide for tax relief, which violates the constitutional mandate as much as would a direct property
tax exemption prohibited by. the constitution. The fact
remains that the property in question is located in
Utah by virtue of its being rnanufactured, processed
or produced in this state, and the legislature may not,
by the simple declaring that such property has no situs
here, grant an exemption to the property which it \vould
be po\verless to do in n1ore forthright language.
POINT II

SE~GTIO·N 59-2-14, U.C.A. 1953, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND VOID EVEN IF PASSED IN ANTICIP A·TION OF A
GO·NTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.
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While probably this point is not properly before this
Court. at this time, the proposition raised by plaintiff
IS demonstrably false.
Many courts have held that a legislature does have
power to enact a statute not authorized by a present
constitution where the statute is passed in anticipation
of a change in the constitution. Usually, this holding
results where the statute itself expressly provides that
it shall take effect upon the adoption of the amendment.
See Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36, 46 S.Ct. ·1-!,
70 L.Ed. 151; Busch v. Tttrner, 26 ·Cal.2d 817, 161 P.2d
456. Additional cases are collected in 171 ~.\.L.R. 1070.
However, an unconstitutional statute is not validated
by a subsequent constitutional amendment "~hich does
not expressly ratify or confirm the statute, but merely
authorizes the enactment of such a statute. Seneca Mi1ling Co., v. 0Bmun, 82 Mich. 573, 47 N.W. 25; Plebst t·.
Barnwell Drilling Co., 243 La. 87-±, 1-l-8 Ho.2d 58-±;
Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska, 1961). See
also 11 Am. J ur., Sec. 151.
This conclusion is supported by the Utah case of
McGrew et al. v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203,
85 P.2d 608. There, the question 'vas raised as to the
effect of a house joint resolution proposing an atnendment to Article X\TI of the Constitution of Utah, authorizing the legislature to provide for the PstablishnlPU t
of a minimum wage for women and minors. ThP resolution was passed by the legislature March 9, 1933, the
same day as the minimum wage law, Chapter 38, L·aws
9
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of lJ tah, 1933, '\yas passed by the legislature. The ainendment in question was subsequently sub1nitted to the
electors and ratified by a majority vote. Plaintiffs in the
case contested the validity of the ratification, while the
state argued that the amendment was retroactive. ThP
Court said:
"We need not pass upon the question because
the amendment if validly adopted and ratified
would not be retroactive. The minimum vvage law,
if valid, must have been within the legislative
po,ver to enact when it was adopted in March,
1933, that is under the Constitution without the
amendment . ..." (Emphasis supplied.)
While the Court went on to find that the legislature
had the power to enact legislation relating to the e~
tablishment of minimum "rages, the implication remains
clear that had it not such power, the minimun1 \vage la'Y
would have been void.
The language of the amendment is pertinent. Substitute S.J.R. 5, L'a"Ts of Utah 1963, p. 670 provides:
". . . Tangible personal property present in
Utah on January 1, m., \Yhich is held for sale or
processing and which is shipped to final destination outside this State within t\velve 1nonths
may be deemed by law to have acquired no situs
in Utah for the purposes of ad valorem property
taxation and may be exempted by law from such
taxation whether manufactured, processed or
produced or otherwise originating within or without the state.... "
ClearlY there is no hint of ratification, nor is there
.'
express 1nention of Section 59-2-1-±, U.C.A. ''Tithout
1(\
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these there is no ratification sufficient to validate Section 59-2:-14, U:C.A.
It is the opinion of the tax commission that Substitute Senate Bill 27 was void at the time of its enactment and even if the amendment is adopted will continue
to be void.
CONCLUSION
Substitute Senate Bill 27, now codified as Section
59-2-14, et seq., U.C.A. 1953, was void when passed, is
now void, and will remain void regardless of 'vhat action
the electorate may take this fall in relation to the proposed amendment to the constitution which will be placed
before it.
'Since the statute is void, any rules and regulations
purporting to implement the same would be void and of
no effeet, and their promulgation a futile and meaningless gesture.
We, therefore, respectfully urge that the petition
of the Foulger Equipment Company for an extraordinary writ in the nature of mandamus be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KE·SLER
Attorney General
F. BURTO·N HOWARD,
Asst. Attorney General
M. REED HUNTER,
Asst. Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents.
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